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South East Asian tax administration issues in 
the drive to attract foreign direct investment: Is 
a regional tax authority the way forward?
Timothy Brand1, Alistair Hodson2 and Adrian Sawyer3
Abstract
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region is of growing importance to foreign investing New Zealand 
businesses. Under the umbrella of a case study focussing on Vietnam, this paper utilises interviews and phenomenology 
observations to ascertain the particular tax administration issues that are of concern to foreign investors. The research then 
explores the possibility of establishing an ASEAN-based Regional Tax Authority (RTA) as a way of alleviating such tax 
administration issues and, ultimately, increasing foreign investment into the ASEAN region. It is suggested that the 
establishment of an ASEAN RTA is the best way forward.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Over recent decades, developing South East (SE) Asian nations have been the subject 
of monumental political, cultural and economic change.  Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 
and Myanmar, are at varying points on the journey to development, yet the combined 
economic significance of the region is undisputable.4  In relation to Vietnam, Tran-
Nam considers economic growth to be the most important determinant of economic 
development, with good tax policy a cause rather than a result of such progress.5
It has been argued that promoting economic growth is almost synonymous with 
attracting inbound foreign direct investment (FDI).6  The United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recognised that deciding whether to invest in 
a nation is a vexed decision, with a nations policy framework being one factor 
considered by potential investors, along with economic considerations (market size, 
infrastructure etc.) and the ease of doing business in the chosen nation.7  There is a 
plethora of research pertaining to the inverse relationship between corporate income 
taxes (CIT) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), including Hartmans quantitative 
study.8  However, the majority of this literature is United States (US) centric in nature 
with a focus on inbound US investment, and thus fails to consider the tax 
administration challenges unique to developing countries.  Despite this limitation, 
Hines survey of multiple quantitative studies found an elasticity of 0.5 to 0.6 
between CIT rates and FDI, which, due to being less than perfect, supports the view of 
the UNCTAD that the decision to invest in a nation is multifaceted and not solely 
dependent on corporate tax rates.9  Instead, an effective tax administration is one of 
many important considerations.10  Therefore, it is clear that an effective, legitimate tax 
administration is a key determinant of attracting FDI and stimulating economic 
development.
The tax literature pertaining to FDI focuses almost exclusively on the relationship 
between tax rates and investment levels.  Administrative factors, such as red tape 
and compliance costs, can also weigh significantly on investment decisions.  However, 
somewhat alarmingly, it is observed that empirical studies have practically ignored 
these important considerations.11  Tax administration issues not only fall within the 
ambit of the UNCTADs policy framework category but also under the business 
  
4 Nolan C Sharkey, , Greater China and South East Asia in Nolan Sharkey (ed) Taxation in ASEAN and 
China: Local Institutions, Regionalism, Global Systems and Economic Development, (Routledge, 2012),
113.
5Binh Tran-Nam, Tax Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam in Nolan Sharkey (ed.) Taxation 
in ASEAN and China: Local Institutions, Regionalism, Global Systems and Economic Development,
(Routledge, 2012), 126147.
6 Tran-Nam, n 5 above.
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003), World Investment Report, 85, 1-322 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2003_en.pdf>.
8 David Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (1984) 37 National 
Tax Journal, 475488.
9 James R Hines, Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation (1999) 52 National Tax 
Journal 305322.
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, n 7 above.
11 Tran-Nam, above n 5,137.
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facilitation head due to the intrinsic link between tax administration and the ease of 
doing business.  It is thus conceivable that tax administration issues can play a 
significant role in attracting FDI, giving a basis for the present study to test this 
relationship in addition to identifying current SE Asian tax administration issues 
relevant to foreign investors, and also investigating whether a Regional Tax Authority 
(RTA) may be an appropriate solution.
While some researchers have argued that externally imposed initiatives in tax 
administration are likely to be resisted, if not rejected, by local interests, they fail to 
explore the potential acceptability of a less radical proposal aimed at foreign interests 
as opposed to local interests.12  Vehorn appositely observes that administrative 
reform should aim for simplification of the law and taxpaying processes and ideally be 
implemented by a government with a strong political will for modernisation under a 
structured plan, preferably incrementally. 13  This is in accordance with Birds 
suggestion that administrative reforms are most effective when simple and well 
sequenced.14  It is in agreement with these remarks that the present research explores 
the feasibility and perceptions from a range of businesses, academics and tax
practitioners of an RTA which would conceivably act as an intermediary between 
foreign investors and SE Asian governments/tax authorities to pragmatically address 
current problems prohibiting the ease of foreign investment.
1.2 Importance of South East Asia as a trading partner for New Zealand
Due to SE Asias rapid development and emergence as a global economic powerhouse, 
there is substantial demand for reform proposals from SE Asian nations wishing to 
maintain such high growth rates (due in part to FDI capital injections), and also from 
foreign enterprises which require certainty and transparency in a tax administration as 
a prerequisite to making foreign investments.  From a New Zealand (NZ) perspective, 
SE Asia is of immense importance to future economic growth, with China recently 
having overtaken Australia as NZs largest trading partner and the wider Asian region 
constituting a significant 40 percent of total merchandise imports and exports with 
NZ.15  With the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations on-going, NZ trade and 
investment in SE Asia is set to markedly increase from an already substantial 29 NZ 
companies investing $2.37 billion as of 2011.16  While NZs network of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), which lay the legal groundwork for investment in Asia 
continues to grow, such investment opportunities may be neglected if the tax 
administration in that country is uncertain or problematic.
This study aims to side-step the current tax administration challenges faced by foreign 
investors by exploring the possibility of establishing an RTA at the international 
  
12 David Chaikin and Maria Dyball, Tax Compliance and Administrative Challenges: Lessons from the 
Philippine experience in Nolan Sharkey (ed.) Taxation in ASEAN and China: Local Institutions, 
Regionalism, Global Systems and Economic Development (Routledge, 2012) 7397, 91.
13 Charles L Vehorn, Fiscal Adjustment in Developing Countries through Tax Administration Reform,
(2011) 45(1) The Journal of Developing Areas323338.
14 Richard Bird, Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin (2004) March,
134150.
15 Hugh Dixon and Jason Leung-Wai (2012), Foreign Direct Investment: New Zealand and Asia, Asia: 
New Zealand 
Foundation<http://asianz.org.nz/files/Foreign_Direct_Investment_New_Zealand_and_Asia.pdf>.
16 Dixon and Leung-Wai, n 15 above.
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(regional) level.  This is achieved through use of qualitative research techniques, 
namely interviews and direct author observations.
After spending three months living and working in Vietnam, from late 2012 though to 
early 2013, one of the authors was able to witness the hunger for FDI from state 
authorities whilst also sensing the hesitation and concerns held by potential investors 
with regard to issues including uncertainty in the tax administration.  The 
identification of tax administration issues that curtail the alignment of foreign investor 
and SE Asian state interests has motivated the current researchs normative, forward-
looking orientation.  Increased FDI will accelerate SE Asian growth rates, whilst also 
benefiting foreign investing enterprises and their home nations, which ultimately 
receive the after-tax profits from off shore operations and investments.  Such research 
is also motivated by the notable lack in the literature of such studies and reform 
proposals as is discussed in the following sections.
The tax literature is arguably lacking a recent study of SE Asian tax administration 
issues specific to foreign investors.  It is also notably lacking any normative 
consideration of an RTA which would ostensibly administer taxes exclusively for 
foreign investors.  Whilst Sharkey has proposed a SE Asian Regional Tax 
Organisation (RTO), the following discussion shows that Sharkeys proposal is more 
extreme in its functionality, with few features in common with the proposed RTA.17  
Despite these conceptual differences, the present study seeks to comment on the 
feasibility and attractiveness of the Sharkey proposal to determine whether it may be 
an end point that could be reached after the initial establishment of an RTA through 
a process of gradualism.  Therefore, the interrelated research questions are:
RQ1 What are the tax administration issues faced by foreign investors in SE Asia 
nations and to what extent do such tax administration issues influence FDI decisions?
RQ2 What is the feasibility/perception of an RTA as a means of countering such 
issues?
RQ3 Pragmatically, is it feasible to view the RTO proposed by Sharkey as an end 
point subsequent to the establishment of an RTA?
  
17 Sharkey, n 4 above.
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2. REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH ON SOUTH EAST ASIA TAX ADMINISTRATIONS AND 
REGIONAL/GLOBAL TAX ORGANISATION PROPOSALS
This review first examines recent studies of SE Asian tax administrations and notes a 
number of thematic administration issues.  Secondly, previously proposed solutions to 
deficient tax administrations of large taxpayer units (LTUs) and autonomous or semi-
autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs) will be critiqued.  Finally, recent calls for a 
global or SE Asian RTO will be noted and distinguished from the present, less 
radicalised proposal for reform.
2.1 Prior studies on South East Asian tax administration issues
With foreign investment being critical to the regions economic growth, it is curious to 
note that literature on tax administration in SE Asia tends to focus on issues related to 
domestic compliance problems rather than the subcategory of administration issues 
which are of relevance to foreign investors.  Despite this general trend, several papers 
contain analysis of issues relevant to the present study, including Chaikin and Dyballs 
study18 of the Philippines tax compliance and administration issues.  Chaikin and 
Dyballs study surveys various compliance and administrative challenges in the 
Philippines, seemingly on the basis of pre-existing literature and empirical data.  It is 
noted that corruption is rampant and so deeply entrenched in the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (BIR) that the Philippines Congress has considered the BIRs complete 
disestablishment in favour of starting out fresh.19
Additionally, Chaikin and Dyball refer to a 2008 Social Weather Station (SWS) 
survey gauging the extent that businesses encountered corruption in the revenue 
authorities.  An alarming 71 percent of respondents reported having been asked for a 
bribe, 31 percent when paying import duties and 46 percent when paying income taxes.  
More telling, 79 percent of respondents did not report the solicitation accompanying 
these bribes as they believed that nothing would be done.20
Perhaps of greater relevance to potential investors, the corruption perceptions index 
(Transparency International) shows markedly high levels of perceived corruption in 
the Philippines.21  This index is calculated by country analysts through extensive 
surveying of business people, with unbiased hard data being inherently difficult to 
obtain on such a politically sensitive issue.22
As with Chaikin and Dyball, Tran-Nams case study of Vietnam does not focus 
directly on tax administration issues relevant to foreign investors, yet it still notes 
several systematic administration issues relevant to the present study. 23  After 
critiquing the gradual lowering of CIT rates, Tran-Nam claims that administrative 
reform is needed, yet refrains from detailing how or what the reform should be.24  
It is observed by Heij that issues in the Vietnamese tax administration include 
taxpayer compliance costs stemming from legal problems, the time taken to deal with 
  
18 Chaikin and Dyball, above n 9.
19 Ibid 73.
20 Ibid 75.
21 Transparency International, (2012), Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,
<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>.
22 Chaikin and Dyball, above n 12.
23 Tran Nam, above n 5.
24 Ibid 137.
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bureaucracy, hidden fees and the objection and appeal process. 25  Other issues 
identified include high corruption, low education and low compensation of tax 
officials who are also subject to low political accountability due to the single party 
political system.  Tran-Nam reasons that these issues are contributing factors towards 
Vietnams low ranking in the World Banking Groups ease of doing business report 
series, and suggests that commitment and implementation of tax administration 
measures [by the government] will send a very positive signal to foreign investors.26  
However, the study did not investigate what reform options may be appropriate.
A quantitative study by Ajaz and Ahmad was the first to test the relationship between 
corruption, good governance and total tax revenues collected.27  Through the use of an 
econometric model, it was found that high corruption levels in a tax administration 
result in lower revenue collections, while a positive relationship was observed 
between tax collection and good governance (including strategic planning) of such 
authorities.  A more recent study by Mansor and Tayib is the first to look at the 
existence of strategic planning (a feature of good governance) in a SE Asian tax 
administration, finding disparities between the practices observed and international 
norms.28  Ajaz and Ahmads study is particularly significant for the present study as it 
was found that tax administration issues relevant to foreign investors, which have been 
identified by prior studies, have an adverse impact on revenue collection.29  This 
enables the inference to be drawn that both SE Asian revenue authorities and foreign 
investors are experiencing sub-optimal investment outcomes due to tax administration 
issues.
2.2 Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) and Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities (SARA)
A survey of the literature reveals a plethora of solutions to tax administration 
problems, although few have proved to be successful or adaptable to the unique 
circumstances of developing nations.  Vehorn reviewed proposals arguing for and 
against the establishment of large taxpayer units (LTUs) in developing countries, 
finding that such bodies are fundamentally flawed in their conception.30  LTUs have 
been propagated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a way of enhancing 
revenue flows by way of creating a specialised unit within a nations revenue authority 
tasked with collecting taxes from large taxpayers.31  Proponents for such units observe 
that less than 10 percent of enterprises in developing countries typically contribute 
between 50 percent and 90 percent of tax revenue, with a highly trained one stop shop 
LTU creating fewer opportunities for corruption, thus increasing tax collection.32
Through statistical analysis of economic data collected before and after the 
implementation of LTUs by 40 developing countries, Vehorn found that while tax 
  
25 Gitte Heij, Costs of Compliance: the Taxpayers Hidden Tax Burden (1995) 1(1) Asia-Pacific Tax  
Bulletin,2224.
26 Tran Nam, above n 5, 142.
27 Tahseen Ajaz and Eatzaz Ahmad, The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues (2010) 
49(4) The Pakistan Development Review, 405417.
28 Mansor Muzainah and Mahamad Tayib, Strategic Planning in Public Organisations: The Case of a Tax 
Administration in a Developing Country (2012) 1(8) Business Management Dynamics 2033.
29 Chaikin and Dyball, above n 12,; Tran-Nam, above n 2; Mansor and Tayib, above n 28.
30 Vehorn, above n 13.
31 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Improving Large Taxpayers Compliance: A Review of Country 
Experience (2002),<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/215/index.htm>.
32 Vehorn, above n 13.
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revenue rose in 32 of the 40 countries, tax share (collections/GDP) increased in only 
10 of 40 countries, with a decline witnessed in 43 percent of the nations studied.  
Pertinently, it was found that the implementation of an LTU in developing nations 
suffering tax administration issues such as corruption is not systematically associated 
with higher economic growth.33  However, Vehorn reaches these conclusions based 
on the experience of developing nations outside SE Asia, and fails to take into account 
external events such as wartime conflicts and the global financial crisis (GFC).  
Regardless, this study indicates that the establishment of LTUs guarantees neither 
economic growth nor (significantly) enhanced revenue flows.34
Another solution to many of the unique challenges faced by developing countries is 
the establishment of an autonomous or Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA) 
operating under an organisational structure with many features in common with 
private sector organisations.35  Devas, Delay and Hubbard, for example, note in this 
regard that the role of the government is to steer, not to row.36  The authors state that 
the rationale behind an SARA is that independence from the government can yield 
greater efficiencies as a result of lower levels of corruption than is found in the public 
sector and being able to invest in sophisticated staff training.  Mann adds that SARAs 
are typically introduced as a measure to remedy the lack of transparency in revenue 
authorities which can be indicative of corruption.37
A more recent IMF survey of various SARAs found that they operate with varying 
degrees of autonomy, yet they share common features.38  A later Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) analysis found that indicators of 
autonomy, or rather, the SARAs ability to operate independently of government, 
include its independence in organisational planning and budget management, whether 
it sets its own performance measurement standards, and whether it has control over its 
human resource policies.39  Through comparative analysis of SARAs in existence, 
Crandall found that 75 percent have empowered management boards, 70 percent 
operate outside the public service and 30 percent are funded independently by 
retaining a percentage of their tax collection.40
With extensive use of the SARA model in Africa, Devas et al.s study of the Ugandan 
experience exposes several weaknesses with this reform option.41  Uganda introduced 
a SARA to combat extensive corruption and staff training deficiencies that were 
  
33 Ibid 334.
34 Ibid.
35 William Crandall, Revenue Administration: Autonomy in Tax Administration and the Revenue 
Authority Model, IMF Technical Notes and Manual 10/12 (2010) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1012.pdf>.
36 Nick Devas, Simon Delay and Michael Hubbard, Revenue Authorities: Are they the Right Vehicle for 
Improved Tax Administration? (2001) 21(3) Public Administration and Development, 211222.
37 Arthur J Mann (2004), Are Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities the Answer to Tax Administration 
Problems in Developing countries? A Practical Guide Research paper for the project: Fiscal Reform in 
Support of Trade Liberalization <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADC978.pdf>.
38 International Monetary Fund (2006), Revenue Authorities: Issues and Problems in Evaluating Their 
SuccessWP/ 06/240 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06240.pdf>.
39 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009), Tax Administration in 
OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2009),(OECD, 2009).
40 Crandall, above n 35.
41 Devas et al., above n 36.
eJournal of Tax Research South East Asian tax administration issues in the struggle to attract foreign direct investment
292
thought to be the reason for its poor tax share.42  Devas et al. observe that while the 
desired results were initially obtained with dramatic increases in tax share, problems 
of corruption have re-emerged highlighting that SARAs do not guarantee isolation 
from political interference, incompetence or malpractice.43  There is no discussion in 
the literature on whether the effectiveness of the SARA model in developing nations 
may differ if it were fully autonomous and operating at an international (or regional) 
level.
2.3 Reform proposal: A World Tax Organisation
While SARAs and LTUs are currently in existence, Sawyer proposed the forward 
looking and normative establishment of a World Tax Organisation (WTO) as a 
solution to certain tax challenges in an increasingly integrated and globalised world 
with many cross-border transactions and companies operating across many 
jurisdictions.44  Sawyer proposes that the initial jurisdiction of such a body be limited 
to binding (advance) rulings and advance pricing agreements (APAs) accompanied by 
a dispute resolution function giving standing to private parties.  Sawyer argues that 
over time, through gradualism, an international organisation should assume ever 
greater authority for coordinating administrative tax policy and processes for cross-
border business transactions, although Sawyer adds the caveat that he is not a 
proponent of complete harmonisation.45
Pinto and Sawyer reason that a WTO could have the subsidiary benefit of being a 
global relationship bridge to share research and best practices in tax administration.46  
Usefully, their study examines the limited roles of a wide range of international 
organisations that may constitute associations of tax organisations, ultimately 
concluding that the proposed WTO would be an appropriate body for such a function.  
Sawyer acknowledges that his research is certainly not the final work on the topic [of 
a WTO] with several aspects unexplored including the potential expansion of its 
jurisdiction.47  The possibility of a regional tax authority with the independence and 
jurisdiction of the proposed WTO is also not examined by these studies.
2.4 Proposed regional tax organisations
It is appropriate to recognise that the OECD plays a limited but significant role in 
international tax administration, primarily by encouraging double tax agreements 
(DTAs), Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) and by setting guidelines for 
complex issues such as transfer pricing (TP) and exchange of information standards.  
It should also be noted that the United Nations (UN) Model Double Taxation 
  
42 Crandall, above n 35.
43 Devas et al., above n 36, 213 and 221.
44 Adrian Sawyer, Developing a World Tax Organisation: The Way Forward, (Birmingham, Fiscal 
Publications, 2009), ix. This study builds upon the pioneering work of Tanzi; see Vito Tanzi, Is there a 
Need for a World Tax Organisation? in Assaf Razin and Efraim Saka (eds), The Economics of 
Globalisation: Policy Perspectives from Public Economics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 173186.
45 Sawyer, above n 44, 9. Kerrie Sadiq, The Traditional Rationale of the Arms Length Approach and 
Transfer-pricing. Should the Separate Accounting Model be Maintained for Multinational Entities? 
(2004) 7(2) Journal of Australian Taxation, 196, 241.
46 Dale Pinto and Adrian Sawyer, Building Bridges between Revenue Authorities: Would a World Tax 
Organisation be a Key Facilitator? (2011) Journal of Applied Law and Policy, 2538.
47 Sawyer, above n 44, 208.
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Convention between Developed and Developing Countries,48 is used extensively in 
the negotiation of DTAs, placing an emphasis on source taxation.  However, the 
OECD DTA model is often used where a developing country is negotiating a DTA 
with an OECD member.  The OECDs limited role in this sphere has been subject to 
criticism from academics including Bazo who claim that standards set by the OECD 
are viewed dimly by developing economies, with the perception being that the 
OECDs interests are ostensibly for the benefit of developed economies.49
Further, Sharkey criticises the OECD as merely entrenching established tax principles 
of source and residence, which makes fundamental changes in international tax policy 
increasingly difficult.50  Sharkey and Bain argue that the jurisdictional nexus rules of 
source and residence are incompatible with the current era of international business 
and economic transnationalism.  Thus organisations such as the OECD, which are 
perceived as serving the interests of developed countries over developing countries, 
and which have a conservative approach to international taxation reform, may not be 
appropriate bodies to further an agenda of radical tax administration reform in the SE 
Asian region.51
As previously noted, ASEAN is a geo-political and economic organisation with 
membership comprising Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, and it operates with social, 
economic, defence and cultural mandates.  An ASEAN policy document stipulates 
that economic integration is one of the aims of ASEAN, with the end goal being a 
single unified market comparable to the European Union (EU).52
Sharkey uses this mandate as the foundation for a proposed SE Asian RTO which 
would contribute towards economic integration of ASEAN countries whilst refraining 
from political harmonisation as seen in the EU.53  The motivation for such a change is 
the interconnected nature of the regional economies, with globalisation and the 
elimination of harmful regional tax competition argued to be better served by the 
establishment of an RTO.  In support of Sharkey and Bain, Sharkey proposed the 
establishment of a regional concept of source and residence, not restricted by 
national or geographical borders.54  Sharkey then proposed that a regional common 
tax rate be set, with the administration and collection of SE Asian taxes being 
undertaken by the RTO before being distributed to the various nations.55
Significantly, however, it must be noted that the proposal fails to address the issue of 
how the common tax rate would be set.  Any international organisation requiring a 
state to hand over the sovereign task of setting its tax rates is inherently radical in 
  
48 United Nations (5 April 2012), Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries < http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/double-taxation-
convention.html>.
49 Andres E Bazo, (2008), The International Tax Organization, a Proposal Destined for Failure?
Working Paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319929>.
50 Nolan Sharkey, A South East Asian Tax Organisation, (2013) British Tax Review, 2, 175191.
51 Nolan Sharkey and Katherine Bain, Tax Residence and Regions: Addressing South East Asian 
Transnationalism through ASEAN, in Nolan Sharkey (ed.) Taxation in ASEAN and China: Local 
Institutions, Regionalism, Global Systems and Economic Development, (Routledge, 2012),236258, 236.
52 ASEAN (1997), Vision 2020, ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/news/ item/asean-vision-2020>.
53 Sharkey, above n 50.
54 Sharkey and Bain, above n 51.
55 Sharkey, above n 50.
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nature.  It should also be recognised that a proposed RTO would encounter numerous 
complexities if tasked with assessing the hundreds of millions of domestic residents 
within the SE Asian region as opposed to merely concentrating on foreign investors.  
Regardless, the Sharkey proposal provides a useful reference point for the present 
study.  Its radicalism leaves a notable gap between the status quo and the proposed 
RTO in which a less radical but equally effective RTA can be explored.56
2.5 Conclusion from the prior research
The preceding examination of the prior research has shown that there are many tax 
administration issues plaguing the SE Asian region.  However, not only is there a lack 
of research into these issues beyond a relatively small number of isolated studies, but 
these studies fail to determine which particular issues are faced by foreign investors as 
opposed to taxpayers in general.  Research on domestic level LTUs and SARAs 
was also examined, indicating that such solutions have failed in practice due, 
primarily, to a failure to prevent the re-emergence of corruption.  However, aspects of 
the LTU and SARA solutions, such as increased staff training, will be considered in 
the present study as possible features of the proposed RTA.
Likewise, the proposed WTO is radical in its conception and, although not directly 
concerned with the SE Asian region, contains several attractive features such as an 
accessible disputes settlement function and the issuance of binding rulings. 57  
Sharkeys proposed RTO is radical and extreme and could potentially be viewed as an 
end point rather than a starting point for reform.58  Thus, it is clear that there have 
been no proposals in the literature exploring the feasibility of a less radical RTA 
acting as an intermediary between foreign investors and SE Asian States.
3. RESEARCH APPROACH
This study focuses on Vietnam, although some of the data collected relates to the 
wider ASEAN region as opposed to being Vietnam specific.  This case study utilises 
mixed research methods, which primarily consisted of semi-structured interviews, but 
also includes phenomenological observations.  Interviewees were asked questions 
pertaining to their perceptions of a potential RTA, both in relation to the identified 
administration issues, and whether it would likely prove attractive to foreign investors 
in their capital investment decisions.
3.1 Interviews
The interview subjects included three academics with knowledge of ASEAN tax 
administration, senior executives or tax managers of NZ companies that have invested 
or are considering investing in Vietnam, one who has worked for New Zealand Trade 
and Enterprise (NZTE) in SE Asia, and a NZ tax adviser, who provides advice to NZ 
companies on SE Asia market entry.  For practical and ethical reasons, individuals 
currently residing in Vietnam were not interviewed.  While this may appear to be a 
limitation, it was largely to improve the validity of the study, as individuals living in 
Vietnam may not feel that they are in a position to be open to discussing challenges 
  
56 Ibid.
57 Sawyer, above n 44.
58 Sharkey, above n 50.
eJournal of Tax Research South East Asian tax administration issues in the struggle to attract foreign direct investment
295
in the tax administration, and may subsequently provide opaque, misleading or false 
information.
With this study being explorative, there is no intention to seek to generalise the 
findings from the interviews.  Nevertheless, it was our intention to interview a 
sufficient number of subjects so as to ensure any emerging themes had qualified 
support.  Eight interviews were undertaken with the subjects selected on the basis of 
their expertise and experience concerning FDI and Vietnam.  In the case of the 
academic subjects, these were selected from a very small pool of established 
Australasian researchers examining SEA tax administration issues.  The senior 
executives, tax managers, and advisors were either key personnel in businesses that 
one of the authors had established prior contact with or were known to be actively 
involved in undertaking or advising on FDI in Vietnam.
The literature suggests that a defensible absolute minimum number of interviewees is 
six, with typical interview samples involving twelve or more subjects (or ceasing at 
the point of saturation when no new information is gleaned from the last 
interviewee).59  As Morse observes, it is not the quality of data that is theoretically 
important but the richness of the data derived from the detailed description.60  In this 
study, given its exploratory nature and the relatively small number of experts and NZ 
businesses known to be actively involved in FDI in Vietnam, the number of potential 
interviewees was small.  The resulting findings give us no reason to believe that had a 
wider pool of subjects been included, the emerging themes and issues would be 
significantly different.
The interviews were semi-structured enabling the what and why questions to be 
asked with regard to administrative issues before delving into the exploratory aspects 
of the case study, which sought to gauge the interviewees perceptions of the proposed 
RTA as a solution to the tax administration issues raised in the earlier phase of the 
interview.  Issues raised by interviewees in early interviews formed the basis of 
questions in later interviews.  Although this means that the interview findings could 
not be directly compared, the evolving nature of some of the interview questions 
benefitted the research findings.
Each interview subject was provided with a non-exhaustive overview of the questions 
to be discussed approximately 24 hours prior to the interview, along with an 
information sheet which outlined the scope of the research.  Prior human ethics 
approval was sought and granted.  All interview subjects were presented with a 
consent form prior to the interview with all but one subject consenting to their names 
being included in the results section.  One interview was conducted via telephone, 
with the remainder being conducted in person.  With the consent of all interviewees, 
  
59 With research involving phenomenology (as in the current study), Creswell suggests five to 25; see 
John Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions, (Thousand 
Oaks, Sage, 1998), 64.  Morse suggests the minimum should be at least 6; see Janice M Morse (1994), 
Designing funded qualitative research in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2nd ed, 1994), 22035, 225.  See also Glenn A Bowen, 
Naturalistic Inquiry and the Saturation Concept: A Research Note (2008) 8(1) Qualitative Research, 
137152.  Further useful guidance is provided by Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce and Laura Johnson, How 
Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability, (2006) 18(1) Field 
Methods, 5982.
60 Janice M Morse, The Significance of Saturation(1995) 5(2) Qualitative Health Research, 147149, 
148.
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the interviews were electronically recorded to allow for accurate transcription of 
relevant quotes.  The transcripts were then analysed to ascertain common themes and 
concerns among interviewees.  Interviewees companies and names have been 
anonymised.
3.2 Author observations
Phenomenological research unsurprisingly is a study of a phenomenon, which could 
be a relationship or activity.  It differs from ethnographic research in that it is not 
constrained to studies of culture and the phenomenological researcher tends to 
experience the phenomenon being researched as opposed to merely observing other 
participants.61
The phenomenological observations were collected by one of the authors while living 
and working in Vietnam for three months from late 2012 through to early 2013.  
Unlike ethnography, the observations do not pertain to internal phenomena within the 
observers employer organisation, but rather, to what was observed during 
interactions with the Vietnamese tax authorities when one of the present authors was 
effectively an agent of foreign investors.  As such, the observations are largely 
between one of the authors and the Vietnamese tax administration (a public authority).  
The observations pertain to the problems faced by foreign investors in the 
administration of their taxes.  The observations, recorded in diary form, are limited in 
their scope and are intended to supplement the empirical data gained through the 
interviews discussed above.
4. THEMES AND ANALYSIS EMERGING FROM THE INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS
The present section identifies common themes that have been drawn from an analysis 
of the interview and phenomenology data.  Illustrative quotes collected from the 
interviews are included to support the thematic observations.  The findings are 
analysed in relation to the preceding research questions and literature review, before 
being discussed in a more general sense in the following discussion section.
4.1 The importance of South East Asia for New Zealand businesses
All interviewees perceived the SE Asia region to be an area of high growth, with 
exponentially increasing consumer demand levels presenting opportunities for NZ 
businesses that are unmatched by the relatively stagnant domestic NZ market.  While 
all interviewees noted that China has historically been the Asian investment 
destination of choice for NZ businesses looking to break into the Asian market since 
the 1998 Asian financial crisis, there was a common theme of caution against over-
investing in a single market.  This is illustrated by the following interview extract 
from Company A:
Companies like to diversify, so companies will not put all their eggs in one 
market, so we will see growth in both SE Asia and China.  If youre 
concentrating on only one [market], you will lose opportunities in the others.
  
61 Margaret McKerchar, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting, (Thomson 
Reuters, 2010).
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It is also apparent from the interviews that it is not only Vietnam which is regarded by 
investors as an attractive investment destination, but also a range of other SE Asian 
markets, as indicated by Company B:
We see it [SE Asia] as a growth spot and have looked around Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  However, we see a lot more interest from NZ 
clients looking to go into Vietnam  a three hour circle [flight time] around 
NZ includes a [much] smaller range of customers than three hours from 
Hanoi and HCMC [Ho Chi Minh City]  so we see growth across the SE 
Asia region, but would be looking to hub it through Vietnam.
Also of note, Adviser A observed that intra ASEAN trade is relatively low when 
compared to other global regions due to the poor surface infrastructure plaguing 
developing ASEAN nations.  As a result, it was reasoned by Adviser A that FDI is in 
high demand from developing SE Asian nations to either directly assist with 
infrastructure development, or provide tax revenues to fund such projects stating:
NZ companies can get involved with infrastructure development in the 
region.  The time is now.  We will see more in the next 10 years in the way 
of demand for investment than the 5 years after that.
As such, it is clear that there is a strong desire from NZ companies to invest in SE 
Asia in addition to there being a correlating demand for such investment from SE 
Asian countries.
4.2 Factors considered in foreign direct investment decisions and the role of the tax 
administration
An important aspect of the present research is to determine whether a potential 
investment destinations tax administration is a factor considered by foreign investors 
when making investment decisions.  If not, then the rationale underpinning the 
establishment of an RTA aimed at increasing FDI flows through improved tax 
administration would be undermined.  Fortunately, the interviews found that tax 
administration is one factor considered by investors.
However, a common theme expressed by all interviewees was that it is one of many 
considerations, and is usually not the predominant factor driving investment decisions.  
The prevalent considerations for businesses tended to be either the regions low 
manufacturing costs as a result of affordable labour rates or, alternatively, SE Asias 
rapidly rising wealth and resulting consumer demand for western products and 
services.  Company B invested primarily because of the former consideration, which 
has given its services a competitive advantage when sold in the NZ market.  
Company A invests primarily on the latter consideration, with the regions low 
manufacturing costs largely irrelevant to its FDI decisions by virtue of its product 
being produced in NZ.  Academic B commented that tax considerations are ever-
present, yet secondary considerations when deciding whether to invest in Vietnam:
Investment into Vietnam is very dependent on international macro-economic 
conditions  as is evidenced by the fact that FDI [into Vietnam] fell 
dramatically during the [1997] Asian financial crisis.
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This theme was supported by other interviewees:
Investment decisions are largely commercially driven, with tax 
considerations becoming important at the how stage as opposed to the if 
stage.  
Company A
While tax [administration] is an important consideration, it cannot lead the 
discussion.  However, there is no question that you want to make sure [that 
you are] paying the correct amount.  It [tax administration] has to be 
considered.
Adviser B
Company B expressed similar views, noting that its investment into Vietnam was 
primarily motivated by increasing domestic NZ demand for software products coupled 
with the desire to reduce labour costs, to allow the business model to employ idle staff 
so it can be in a position to bid for projects with immediate start dates.  However, 
Vietnams political stability, relative to neighbouring ASEAN nations (which is 
inextricably linked to many tax administration functions), was also a fundamental 
investment consideration.
Adviser A agreed that tax administration tends to be a secondary consideration, 
although he reasoned that transparency and consistency in the law is a crucial 
prerequisite for any potential host State.  As such, tax administration can be relevant 
when deciding whether to invest in one SE Asian State over another.  Academic A 
supported this view, arguing that tax administration is relevant when deciding between 
the likes of Singapore or Malaysia, but not so relevant when deciding between 
Singapore and Vietnam.
The thematic finding that the tax administration is not the primary investment 
determinant is perhaps best encapsulated by the following observation by Company 
C:
We dont let the tail wag the dog, which you can do with tax if youre not 
careful.
Group tax manager of Company A added:
 and people have let the tail wag the dog and theyve got themselves in 
[trouble] because of it.
These results confirm the findings of UNCTAD that the decision to invest in a foreign 
country is vexed, with tax administration being one of many considerations. 62  
However, the finding that it is not the most important consideration should not 
undermine its nominal importance, as by virtue of being a consideration, it is capable 
of influencing FDI flows.
  
62 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, above n 7.
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4.3 The role of double tax agreements in foreign direct investment decisions
The interviewees were asked about the importance they placed on the existence of 
DTAs when making investment decisions.  In particular, the interviews sought to 
gauge perceptions of the recently signed DTA between NZ and Vietnam. 63  
Overwhelmingly, the common theme was that while DTAs can be attractive in theory 
as a way of achieving greater predictability in both tax law and administration, their 
effectiveness differs markedly in practice.  As noted by Company A:
DTAs are one factor, but they do not determine why we invest, but more, 
how we invest.  DTAs can create predictability, but like FTAs, we often 
have to actually tell the [tax] officials that they exist.  Also, if Vietnam does 
not like the [outcome from] a DTA, they will ignore it.  We have found this 
all across Asia, with half the problem being that many of these countries 
arent even members of the OECD, so have never bought into OECD rules, 
and [they] dont understand them.  So in practice, they dont work so well.
4.4 Vietnam/ASEAN tax administration issues
The present section of this paper identifies the tax administration issues that are 
currently of concern to foreign investors.  Most of the findings were made in relation 
to Vietnam; however, several interviewees commented on issues encountered in other 
developing ASEAN members.  These findings are included and presumed to be 
generalisable on the assumption that many such issues are common across developing 
countries in the region.
It was found that the native written language of tax laws is not a significant tax 
administration issue for foreign investors.  Vietnamese tax laws are published by 
Vietnamese tax authorities in both Vietnamese and English.  However, where a 
conflict arises, it is the Vietnamese version that takes precedence.  Despite this 
potential conflict, Company A, Company B and Adviser B found the English 
versions of tax statutes to be readable, accessible and not an issue in themselves.
A common tax administration concern among interviewees was the uncertainty of tax 
laws arising from the seemingly arbitrary application of the law as opposed to any 
concern over the substance of the law.  Company A commented:
Often, in the interpretation of tax laws there are three answers.  One, 
technical, being what the rule says.  Two, policy based, which may differ 
from the technical answer and three, what happens in practice.  So 
depending on how you approach things, you can come up with three 
different answers.  Vietnam is right up there with practice differing from 
rules  so understanding tax laws is not [only] technical, but tactical.
The interviewees were willing to pay whatever taxes are applicable according to the 
letter of the law, as a result of favouring a risk averse approach for their SE Asian 
investments.  However, they found it difficult and frustrating to ascertain precisely 
what laws were applicable, and how they apply to complex tax situations.  Such 
difficulty is partially due to the ad-hoc passing of tax law through decrees as opposed 
  
63 See Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Socialist Republic 
of Viet Nam for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income (5 August 2013) <http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/tax-treaties/viet-nam>.
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to statute, and partially due to a cultural misunderstanding by the tax department and 
local advisers of the desire for foreign investing entities to pay tax according to the 
letter of the law, even if such an amount exceeds what is paid in practice.  The 
difficulty in ascertaining what laws are applicable due to their ad-hoc enactment was 
noted by Adviser B:
Vietnam and Indonesia are problematic as they change the law by regulation 
and not by statute.  Regulation can be contrary to statute and statute contrary 
to statute.
Similarly, Company C commented:
[Constant reform of tax laws] can cause a bit of a kerfuffle before things 
settle down and people [taxpayers and tax authorities] understand them.  
How they [laws] read and how they work [in practice] can be two quite 
separate things.
The desire to pay the legally correct amount of taxes as per the letter of the law is 
evidenced by the following remark by Company B:
Im very risk averse.  I dont want to be escorted off to a small room next 
time I land in Vietnam.  I like to pay per the letter of the law, so I need to 
know what the law says I must pay or what I must do  Also, to me, if you 
want to do long term business in a country, you need to do what is right, not 
what is perceived to be right.
The difficulty of ascertaining the correct legal position is also symptomatic of the 
broader administration issue of the difficulty of attaining binding rulings from tax 
authorities, as noted by Adviser B:
Vietnam and Indonesia are the most difficult [countries] in the region to get 
binding rulings from.  It can be difficult to get a decision let alone a binding 
ruling.  Even getting consistent views from two independent advisers can be 
difficult.  I can go to two different legal firms in Vietnam and get two 
different opinions.  This is why we have to structure investments through 
Hong Kong, but you shouldnt have to do that to get certainty of profit.
Academic B hypothesised that the cause of such inconsistent tax interpretations is 
twofold.  First, this is due to a lack of competently trained staff in the tax department, 
and second, it is a result of corruption stemming from poor remuneration of tax 
officials:
There is an inability to attract quality staff with expertise who can get paid 
much more working for a private firm  [which is] expounded by the fact 
that you cannot get a tax degree in Vietnam, so graduates dont have the 
technical expertise.  They [tax departments] are trying to train staff internally, 
but the results are slow.  More digitalisation is needed to reduce face-to-face 
contact which leads to corruption.  The lack of staff rotation is also a 
problem.
This was supported by Academic A:
There are few people employed by each ASEAN tax authority who have the 
required expertise to deal with complex situations.  This is often due to the 
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small size of the authorities, which are not large organisations like the 
Australian Tax Office.  You may have one person who has tax treaties as one 
tenth of their job.
A further tax administration issue linked to the uncertainty of law and inconsistent 
interpretations of tax laws is a culture of corruption in the tax administration with an 
(incorrect) assumption by tax officials that international investors are willing to 
participate in such practices.  While in Vietnam during 2013, one of the authors 
observed the following practice:
Several trips had been made to the HCMC tax department (HCMCTD) over 
the previous months.  The normal procedure is to walk into the waiting area, 
take a ticket number from the automatic dispenser and wait for your number 
to be called over the loud speaker, at which time you would meet with an 
official.  However, the procedure was somewhat different in late January, 
following the recent end of financial year and immediately before the festive 
Chinese New Year holiday period known locally as tet.  As the only 
foreigner in the vicinity, I was immediately struck by the sight of everyone 
else walking into the HCMCTD carrying enormous gifts, typically hampers 
filled with the likes of champagne, French cheese and high quality spirits.  
Instead of waiting for their assigned number to be called, those with the 
largest gifts would proceed almost immediately to a waiting tax officer to 
have their tax issue addressed.
Academic C also recognised the existence of corruption, noting that:
Some [foreign investing] companies like this, as it can be efficient to just go 
to the tax office and find out the outcome and thats that.  On the other hand, 
when it turns against you, you dont have much of a leg to stand on.
Other interviewees, emphasising that their risk averse approaches demand 
that they do not engage in any corrupt practices, confirmed the latter:
We do whats right, not just whats perceived to be right.  This can be a 
point of [cultural] confusion in getting Vietnamese tax advice.  You have to 
say, I dont care what you just told me, I will actually pay four times as 
much, I dont care.
Company B
We have a zero tolerance corporate policy towards corruption, and any in 
practice approach [to tax administration] is dangerous.
Company A
Another common theme was the difficulty faced by investors if they decide to 
challenge a tax ruling or assessment made by a SE Asian tax authority.  It was found 
that dispute settlement functions did not allow for the timely resolution of disputes, as 
is desirable in a commercial context.  There is also a significant imbalance of power in 
the dispute settlement process which is expounded by a lack of transparency in 
judicial systems, and the fact that breaches of tax law are subject to criminal penalties 
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if an offence is established.  As a result, investors and their agents are reluctant to 
challenge tax assessments directly, even when there may appear to be significant legal 
merit supporting their argument.  Ultimately, this creates a greater level of commercial 
uncertainty for foreign investors.  This is supported by the following comments:
Our employees are very reluctant to engage with the local tax authorities 
because they are scared of them.  Tax advisers will often pay the disputed 
amounts themselves, as they dont want to deal with the tax authorities- even 
[they are] scared of them.
Company A
It [challenging determinations] takes time, probably as NZ is not big enough 
to demand the time [of tax officials] that big countries such as the USA can.  
Also, New Zealanders and Australians are too honest to pay assistance 
which is not a bad thing. It is not uncommon to wait 3 to 4 months for a 
reply, but business moves faster than that.
Adviser B
A further tax administration issue experienced by investors in Vietnam was the 
significant cost and time required to collect accurate transfer pricing benchmarking 
data.  The complexity of the process often necessitates the involvement of a high 
quality locally based tax adviser.
As noted by Company B:
TP is an issue.  We have spent a lot on TP benchmarking every two years.  It 
costs a lot of money, but having [a big fours] name on the document gives 
credibility in the case of a potential audit.
The lack of readily available TP data is not only a problem for investors, but also for 
the tax departments which often do not have the expertise or resources to know what a 
fair TP price is, and when tax avoidance may be taking place.  As observed by 
Academic B:
A lack of TP expertise is a major issue (for the Vietnamese tax authority), 
with some companies having taken advantage of Vietnam  causing a loss 
of tax revenue.  The government has stated that TP is one of their main 
priorities, and they have been sending staff overseas to try and foster 
expertise.  Still, their staff are at a knowledge disadvantage in such 
negotiations.
A further issue identified by Company B was the difficulty of getting profits out of 
Vietnam and back to NZ due to anti money-laundering (AML) laws.  Under such 
regulations, letters confirming that the investor has paid all outstanding taxes must be 
shown to the bank prior to the international transfer.  However, the Vietnam tax 
department (HCMC) can be very slow to issue such letters, as observed by Company 
B:
It can be very difficult to get money out of Vietnam.  I waited 5 years to 
make my first dollar and then another 7 months to bring it back.  Many 
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documents need to be verified and sealed, including TP and CIT 
confirmations.
4.5 A Regional Tax Authority (RTA)
The latter part of the interviews sought to collect perceptions on a range of aspects 
regarding the proposed establishment of an RTA.  Prior to the interviews, the 
interviewees were given an advance question outline, which listed several possible 
features of an RTA (see Appendix).  The interviewees were told that the prospective 
RTA would be established at the international level and used by foreign investors to 
pay their SE Asian region taxes.  It was suggested that the RTA would be fluent in the 
investors native language(s), and that the staff would be highly trained.  The 
interviewees were also informed that a dispute settlement function and the ability to 
issue binding rulings could also be included.  It was made clear to the interviewees 
that this list of features is not exhaustive.
4.5.1 Desirability of a Regional Tax Authority
All interviewees supported the establishment of an RTA, with greater commercial 
certainty and predictability of the law seen as the major benefits for investors.  
Multiple interviewees emphasised that an RTA could prove to be particularly valuable 
for NZ companies considering SE Asia market entry, as they will be able to clearly 
identify the tax ramifications flowing from the commercial decision of entering an 
Asian market.  These themes are evident in the following comment by Company A:
If you got all [ASEAN] countries to buy into it, it would be attractive, it 
would be fantastic.  It would add a lot of value.  While we invest on the basis 
of commercial reasons, it would create certainty and predictability which is 
key [for such investments].
4.5.2 Desirable features
The interviewees commonly agreed that the establishment of an RTA could alleviate 
many of the tax administration issues identified in the preceding section.  Overarching 
attributes of timeliness, predictability and accountability were identified as necessary 
traits by the interviewees.  An effective dispute settlement function capable of 
resolving tax disputes in a timely and decisive manner without recourse to the national 
level courts of RTA member States was recognised to be highly desirable, as was the 
ability to issue binding rulings upon request.  In addition to the establishment of a 
quasi-judicial dispute settlement organ, several interviewees emphasised the need for 
an arbitration and/or mediation function. Company A stated:
Its attractive to have some sort of arbitration or mediation.  Court processes 
should be avoided as there is nothing to be won from a court case, anything 
can happen.  From a commercial and business point of view there is often 
some sort of middle ground, so arbitration is preferred.
Academic B added:
I think that a body that can give binding determinations is a wonderful idea; 
it would give much greater certainty and consistency among [RTA member] 
countries.
Before further remarking:
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It [the dispute settlement function] has to be seen as the ultimate authority.  
The countries will have to put significant faith in the ruling to be judged in 
accordance with [their] national laws and conventions, so any vetoing of the 
ruling will undermine it.  So it must be binding to both parties.  I expect the 
RTA to be quite effective, quite powerful, because otherwise it is just 
wasting time.
When commenting on the practical workings of a dispute settlement organ, Academic 
B suggested:
There should be multiple levels of dispute resolution.  Parties should try to 
come to an agreement before going to mediation or before judges [of a 
quasi-judicial function].  The appointment of judges can also be problematic 
as judges tend to have a bias towards their own countries viewpoint.  Judges 
should not be involved in cases pertaining to their home country.  So if the 
dispute was between Vietnam and the US, a Singapore or Thai judge should 
preside.
4.5.3 Transfer pricing
There was overwhelming support among the interviewees for the RTA to establish a 
function tasked with producing TP data for the benefit of both investors and RTA 
member States.  As noted by Adviser B:
TP is particularly difficult in the region as there is a lack of publicly 
available data and it [any available data] is extraordinarily expensive and not 
necessarily accurate.  If the RTA could provide data, this would be very 
helpful.
The attractiveness of such a function not only to foreign investors, but also to RTA 
member States, was emphasised by Academic B:
I think it would be a key role to be played by the organisation.  The 
Vietnamese government would be happy to use TP data provided from 
independent research as they [themselves] currently lack benchmarking data.
Further support came from Academic C:
It sounds like something sensible [to include].  TP is something that the 
countries would be interested in getting right if you are going to preserve the 
independent tax systems, as TP is going to affect their tax take.
4.5.4 Impact on tax adviser use
An additional theme to emerge was an expectation that the establishment of an RTA 
would decrease a foreign investors reliance on tax advisers.  Primarily, this was due 
to the greater predictability, certainty and transparency of tax administration that 
would be achieved by an English speaking RTA.  As observed by Company C:
We would still use a tax adviser, but we would decrease our reliance on them.  
It would be more of a review use rather than a preparation use.  We would be 
attracted to the potential cost savings.
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Similarly for Company B:
Company B is in maintenance mode post set up, but if you were to ask 
me as a company about to embark on an investment, I would love it.  If 
Company B does expand our SE Asian investment beyond Vietnam, we 
would use it [the RTA] instead of advisers.
4.5.5 Challenges/feasibility
The interviewees identified a number of challenges that would have to be overcome 
prior to establishing a functional, politically palatable RTA.  The issues of cost, 
political attractiveness, the physical location of the RTAs headquarters and the 
seemingly arbitrary differential treatment for foreign and domestic businesses were the 
major concerns thematically identified across interviewees.
4.5.6 Cost
The funding of an RTA was seen as a significant issue that would have to be 
addressed.  Academic B argued that the cost should be borne by both the investors 
and RTA member nations:
There needs to be a cost sharing agreement between countries and users.  
The formula for cost sharing would have to take into account that some 
countries receive more FDI than others.
Moreover, Company C warned:
Cost would be an issue, how much we would use it depends on how much it 
would cost.
Adviser A suggested:
Cost wise, it may be best to sit under ASEAN so that all countries can help 
pay for it, perhaps as a proportion of its tax take.  Myanmar and other 
developing countries may go to the World Bank to pay for their share of it-
this fits within their [the World Banks] objectives.
4.5.7 Political acceptability
Interviewees were sceptical of whether culturally, politically and economically diverse 
ASEAN States would be willing to cede certain sovereign rights of taxing and 
cooperate as members of an RTA.  Company A observed:
Inter ASEAN rivalries are potentially a massive barrier.  The underlying 
general hate of countries in Asia [pause]  youd be amazed, and it goes 
back hundreds of years.  These countries are incredibly nationalistic and 
dont easily cede sovereignty.
Similarly, Adviser B commented:
Resistance would come from member States.  I can just see the discussion in 
member parliaments we are giving away our taxing rights  wow!
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Adviser A emphasised that there will likely be differences between modern nations 
such as Singapore and Malaysia, and undeveloped nations like Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Myanmar:
Resistance will be two ways; from developed countries saying whats in it 
for me through to undeveloped countries looking at it from a legal 
standpoint, worried about whose laws would be applied.
Academic A added:
ASEAN nations can be divided into three levels of economic development.  
This can be problematic when working together as I dont think they have a 
common economic goal, or common economic history.  Singapore could 
resist it as Singapore and Malaysia currently have an administrative 
advantage.
This was emphasised by Academic C:
There will always be resistance from those who already have their houses 
together, just like people; States dont like to put their hands in their pockets 
unless there is something coming back.
Before further reasoning:
However, they have committed to the joint ASEAN vision of closer 
integration, and the AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) 2015.
As a result of these findings, it is clear that the bounds of the taxing rights signed over 
to the RTA by members would have to be well defined and narrowly drafted to cover 
only tax administration.  Additionally, the RTA stands a greater chance of attracting 
developed nations such as Singapore if it is established under the ASEAN umbrella.
4.5.8 Location of headquarters
Interrelated to the aforementioned issue of the inter-ASEAN tensions and rivalries is 
the issue of where to domicile the RTA.  It was suggested by Company A that 
Indonesias nationalism as a potential barrier can only be overcome with it being 
located in Jakarta:
Indonesia is problematic as they have announced that they wish to be self-
sufficient by 2022.  In saying that, the ASEAN secretariat is in Jakarta, so 
locating it there could be quite strategic.
However, the majority of interviewees thought that Singapore was the best location, 
both for investors and as an inducement to encourage Singapore to join the RTA. 
Academic B stated:
With Singapore it would have to be tit for tat, you would have to give them 
some benefit such as locating it in Singapore.  I think this would be 
acceptable to Vietnam as Vietnam has a good relationship with Singapore, 
and the ministers would enjoy visiting Singapore.  Singapore hosting the 
RTA  would be the most practical way forward 
eJournal of Tax Research South East Asian tax administration issues in the struggle to attract foreign direct investment
307
4.5.9 Differential treatment
A further concern was raised by Academic C over the potential for differential 
treatment between foreign investors and domestic ASEAN businesses:
The downside is that you are offering two different treatments to domestic and foreign 
businesses.  It would be nice to say administrative treatment and not legal 
treatment, but administrative treatment becomes a real substantive economic 
difference in a weaker rule of law environment.
However, it is equally plausible to argue that any such difference would put pressure 
on RTA members to improve tax administration for domestic companies, with an 
RTA thus benefiting both foreign and domestic taxpayers in the long run.
4.6 Comparison to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Semi-
Autonomous Revenue Authority model
The academic interviewees were asked whether they thought the proposed RTA would 
be plagued by the same troubles as the OECD recommended SARA model.  The 
predominant theme to emerge was that an RTA would not suffer the same problems of 
corruption and low quality staff, primarily due to the fact that it would be at the 
international level as opposed to being a domestic based solution. Academic B stated:
The RTA differs as it is at the international level, so is much more 
transparent, much more robust.  It would be self-policing as each member 
could check each other.
4.7 Practical considerations
Certain practical considerations are inextricably linked to the feasibility of a potential 
RTA.  A common theme to emerge was that an RTA should be representative of all 
member nations.  In order to achieve this end, multiple interviewees suggested the 
establishment of a rotating chair or secretariat, whereby each Member State would 
provide a secretariat to the RTA for a stipulated time period.  Likewise, the dispute 
settlement function would retain judges and mediators from every State, but such 
personnel would not preside over disputes involving their home States.  Therefore, a 
Vietnamese tax law being disputed by an NZ investor may be heard before a Thai 
judge.  Interviewees thematically noted that certain functions of the RTA would have 
to be carried out by ASEAN nationals in order to maintain political palatability.  
However, all academic interviewees identified the importance of employing 
expatriates for certain functions, such as TP data production, which require a high 
level of both independence and technical skill.
It became apparent from the interviews that a RTA is only feasible if it includes 
various accountability mechanisms capable of holding the organisations leadership to 
account.  Given the vested interests of each State, a high degree of transparency needs 
to be maintained in order for each member to be confident that they are receiving the 
correct revenues.  Academic C emphasised the importance of auditing:
It would have to be audited, and as a public body everything would have to 
be publicly available  I dont think its even an option; you would have to 
do that.
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Academic B added that the RTA should produce a comprehensive annual report, 
with an organisational review taking place every five years to ensure that the RTA is 
following its constituted aims.
4.8 Relationship with ASEAN
All interviewees argued that the RTA should sit under the ASEAN umbrella in order 
to gain legitimacy and leverage off the existing shared ASEAN vision.  As noted by 
Academic B:
If set up under ASEAN, it will be more attractive to ASEAN leaders.  
Perception-wise, it will be more attractive to investors.
One problem of basing it under ASEAN is that it would require the common 
agreement of ASEAN members, including potentially problematic nations such as 
Singapore before being established.  However, Academic A appositely notes that 
recent amendments to the ASEAN Charter allow for differential treatment of members.  
Therefore, it would be possible to have several ASEAN members, such as Vietnam, 
Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines, establish a RTA.  If successful, non-
member ASEAN States may decide to join the RTA rather than compete against it.  
Ultimately, it can be concluded that the RTA should be linked to ASEAN.
5. AMORE RADICAL APPROACH?
An important aspect of this study was to assess the bounds of a potential RTA, 
including whether it could, through gradualism, morph into the more radical RTO 
proposed by Sharkey.64  A common theme to emerge from those interviewed was that 
there would be crippling political resistance to Sharkeys RTO proposal.  Interviewees 
viewed it as highly unlikely that nationalistic ASEAN States would be willing to 
surrender the high degree of sovereignty called for by the RTO.  Instead, an RTA was 
viewed as far more feasible than an RTO.
A commonly identified reason for resistance was the differing levels of economic 
development and political mandate across ASEAN members.  This is manifested in
drastically different tax structures, as noted by Adviser B:
There are huge differences in the structure of tax systems across Asia.  You have 
socialist regimes through to extremely free market regimes and tax is an important 
part of how they want to redistribute wealth.  Many ASEAN nations have youthful 
populations; if you dont have a fair distribution of wealth, you would have riots and 
civil disobedience.
Similarly, Adviser A added:
It would be impossible, but it [a RTO] would be a utopia, as it would make it 
so much more transparent and simple.  It just wouldnt happen as these 
countries need to use tax as a tool to manage their economies.
Academic B emphasised the historical political tensions between ASEAN nations 
and how this may prohibit a convergence of tax policy:
  
64 Sharkey, above n 50.
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For countries that have been fighting for independence for so long, I dont 
think they are ready to hand over such sovereignty.  ASEAN countries have 
surprisingly little in common  and are not that united.  The RTA is just 
about right [in terms of feasibility] but they [ASEAN members] would never 
accept a RTO, as the differences are just too great to find a common ground.
All interviewees reasoned that a RTA was far more realistic.  For example:
Pipedream!  It [a RTO] has merits from an idealistic point of view, but has 
no chance politically or even practically.
Company A
The RTA proposed is much more realistic, each country involved will still 
want to have their own rights and set their own tax rates 
Company C
5.1 A social conscience
In addition to the theme suggesting that an RTO would be unfeasible due to varying 
levels of development across ASEAN members and diverse political systems, multiple 
interviewees also expressed concern that their taxes would not go directly to the State 
in which they operate.  Such a social conscience was first raised by Company B, 
before being confirmed by Company A, which is a larger company, suggesting that 
such a concern is held by investors regardless of size.  Company B initially raised
the point:
To me, I like that my tax revenue goes back to the Vietnamese government.  
It feels good that its going there, whereas if it was going to one big pool, I 
would be concerned.
This was then confirmed by Company A:
The element of social responsibility is a genuine one these days, so socially, 
we should pay the right amount of tax for what we are doing in a particular 
country and we have no problem with that.
Academic A suggested that such a social conscience can be part of a wider theme 
of organisations wanting to legitimise their operations and maintain a positive public 
perception:
Its an ongoing theme.  If all else is the same, companies will go to the 
country where they believe in the government and have faith that the 
government will do right with their money.
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5.2 Whether a Regional Tax Organisation should be viewed as an End Goal
On the basis of the above interview findings, it can be concluded that the Sharkey 
proposal should not be viewed as an end goal as it lacks political feasibility, and 
would be immensely difficult to implement.65  However, it is important to note that 
such a conclusion should not preclude certain aspects of the RTO proposal from being 
added to an RTA through a process of gradualism.  A detailed analysis tasked with 
categorising each feature of the RTO proposal as either feasible or unfeasible is 
beyond the scope of the present study.
6. DISCUSSION
From the findings, it is apparent that SE Asian investors face a vast array of tax 
administration issues.  Thematically, these include corruption, uncertainty of the law, 
cumbersome dispute settlement mechanisms and a lack of transfer pricing data.  These 
issues were similar to Chaikin and Dyballs study of the Philippines tax 
administration. 66  It was found that tax administration issues are creating an 
environment of greater uncertainty for foreign investors when making foreign 
investment decisions.
The research also confirmed the findings of the UNCTAD67 that foreign investment 
decisions are multifaceted, with investors taking into account a wide range of factors.  
Nonetheless, it was found that tax administration is a factor in such decisions.  
Therefore, it is possible to draw the inference that improved tax administration can 
lead to increased FDI.
There was substantial support from the interviewees for an RTA as a means for 
addressing the tax administration issues that they identified in the earlier part of the 
interviews.  Particular attributes including a dispute settlement function, the 
production of transfer pricing benchmarking data and the ability to issue binding 
rulings were viewed as highly desirable by the investors, tax adviser and the 
academics interviewed.  Significantly, it was found the Vietnamese government may 
support the RTA taking over certain functions, as it currently lacks in-house 
expertise to be able to produce complex transfer pricing data and administer the DTAs.  
Such a win-win outcome for foreign investors and RTA member States ultimately 
improves the likelihood of States handing over the degree of sovereignty called for by 
the RTA.
Despite the overwhelming support for the proposed RTA, the research identified 
major challenges that such a proposal would have to overcome.  Such challenges 
include cost, political acceptability and the location of headquarters.  The interviews 
suggest that funding may be sourced from the World Bank and that the RTA 
headquarters may have to be located in Singapore in order to ensure its membership in 
the RTA.  It was found that ASEAN members are highly nationalistic, with limited 
historical, cultural or current economic links.  As such, it is suggested that the RTA 
have a rotating Chair, and include staff from all members in order to remain neutral 
as opposed to becoming affiliated with one particular nationality.  Ultimately, careful 
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planning of the RTA organisational structure will be critical for determining whether it 
will be politically acceptable for ASEAN members.
It is suggested that any RTA employ highly trained staff from both RTA member 
States and other nations as expatriates.  Expatriate influence would be valuable for 
collecting and publishing transfer pricing data, where neutrality between investors and 
RTA member States is important for all parties.  The dispute settlement function could 
include a pool of mediators and judges from a range of nationalities, to ensure that 
there is always a perception of judicial independence in the settlement of disputes.  
Together with the numerous accountability mechanisms of auditing and publicly 
available data, these features should collectively ensure that the RTA model is far 
more successful in countering developing country tax administration issues than the 
domestic level SARA or LTU models.  As a result, although beyond the scope of the 
present research, the RTA model could be attractive to investors and developing 
countries in other global regions plagued by similar tax administration issues, such as 
Africa and South America.
The interview findings pertaining to the RTO proposed by Sharkey68 indicate that an 
RTO in its current form is not viewed as an end point to be worked towards through 
a process of gradualism after the establishment of an RTA.  Primarily, this is due to 
the severe political resistance that the proposal would likely face due to the need for 
members to cede a far greater degree of sovereignty than is called for under the 
proposed RTA.  However, this research also found that resistance to an RTO could 
come from investors who have a social conscience towards the societies in which 
they operate, and therefore demand that their taxes benefit their investment host 
nation(s) as opposed to being distributed among RTO members on other grounds as is 
proposed by Sharkey.69 Despite these criticisms, there is substantial scope for an RTA 
to adopt additional features over time.  Further, if RTAs are adopted in other global 
regions such as Africa and South America, it is possible that there could be features 
shared by such RTAs, and interaction with the WTO as proposed by Sawyer.70
7. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Conclusions
Foreign direct investment is immensely important for maintaining the high GDP 
growth rates in SE Asian nations, which are contributing to increased wealth and ever 
higher standards of living.  The present research confirmed that tax administration is a 
consideration evaluated by foreign investors when making FDI decisions.  Therefore, 
it is in the interests of both developing ASEAN members and profit maximising 
foreign investors to resolve the plethora of tax administration issues such as corruption, 
untimely and inconsistent dispute settlement, lack of transfer pricing data and 
difficulty of attaining binding rulings which the present study found to be plaguing the 
region.  While the RTO proposed by Sharkey71 may have theoretical merit, the present 
research suggests that its implementation would be highly problematic.  In contrast to 
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an RTO, the present research found that an RTA is attractive to foreign investors 
while remaining within the bounds of what is practical and politically feasible.  It is 
suggested that the establishment of an RTA is the best way forward as a first step 
that could potentially morph into a more radical organisation over time through a 
process of gradualism.
This research addresses the lack of literature into the particular tax administration 
issues faced by foreign investors before proposing an RTA with a pragmatic 
orientation that has not yet been suggested in the literature.  The RTA is intended to be 
pragmatic, distinguishing itself from the forward looking, yet problematic, proposals 
that have been put forward by academics as a solution to a much broader range of tax 
administration issues (not just those faced by foreign investors).
While the proposed RTA at the centre of the research differs from previous reform 
propositions, it should not necessarily be viewed as contrary to all such proposals.  
Over time, the relatively less radical, foreign investor-oriented RTA could expand in 
its functionality towards the larger, multi-faceted World Tax Organisation as 
developed by Sawyer,72 although this is not explored by the present study.
Aside from academia, the practical implications, and demands for such research from 
investors and SE Asian host States is significant.  SE Asian States stand to benefit 
from increased FDI and tax collections through such an organisation, whilst foreign 
investors will also stand to benefit as they will be able to enter foreign export markets 
with increased ease and certainty.  Ultimately, this increased FDI and trade will 
benefit the economies of investors home nations which receive the benefits of the 
after tax profits from the increased offshore capital investments.  It is hoped that the 
RTA proposed by this research will be further developed to contribute towards a win-
win-win solution for foreign investors, ASEAN nations and non-ASEAN investor 
home economies.
7.2 Limitations
The present research contains several limitations and assumptions that warrant 
acknowledgement.  First, it may be susceptible to criticism on the basis that it is 
fundamentally normative in nature.  A further limitation of generalizability arises due 
to the methodology of a single country case study being used as a basis for the 
proposed RTA which will involve numerous SE Asian nations.
However, many of the interviewees commented not only on their tax administration 
issues in Vietnam, but also on many issues that they had encountered in other 
developing ASEAN countries.  As discussed in the findings section, similar issues 
were found to exist in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines.  Comments 
made by interviewees suggested that Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand do not suffer 
from the same degree of tax administration issues as Vietnam, so certain findings may 
not be as generalisable to these ASEAN members.  However, it should be noted that 
Vietnam can be viewed as at a mid-point of development relative to other ASEAN 
members which acts to improve generalisability, illustrating the suitability of using 
Vietnam as a case study subject.
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Additionally, it is arguable that the data collected with regards to Vietnam may not, in 
itself, be generalisable to the Vietnamese situation due to the small number of 
interviewees.  Given the small potential pool of interview subjects, the interviews 
undertaken, together with the observations of one of the authors (phenomenology), 
collectively provide a justifiable means of collecting data pertaining to foreign 
investor administration issues, and enabling triangulation of the findings.
It is also assumed as a foundation of the present research that FDI leads to economic 
development, which leads to growth, which in turn, leads to improvements in living 
standards.  This view is mainstream and is not challenged by the present research in 
its discussion of why SE Asian nations should support the establishment of an RTA.  
Indeed, the existence of CIT competition in the region indicates that SE Asian nations 
hold a belief that increased FDI is in their economic interests.  The present proposal 
does not address the issue of tax rate competition, and instead focuses on the 
significant benefits that can accrue from improving the regions tax administration.
7.3 Future research
The present research leaves many avenues open for future research to explore.  First, 
there is scope for the Vietnam case study to be replicated by future studies examining 
other ASEAN nations.  Additionally, there is the need for future research to consider 
the practical aspects of a potential RTA, including how it should be constituted and 
how it should overcome the challenges identified in this study.  Such research should 
further consider the Sharkey 73 proposal and how some of its features could be 
included in an RTA despite the present research finding that it is a highly unlikely 
end point in its entirety.
Further, given the present research findings coupled with a global move towards 
regionalisation, future research could explore the possibility of establishing 
organisations akin to the proposed RTA in regions such as Africa and South America, 
where developing countries suffer from many of the same tax administration 
challenges as developing SE Asia nations.  Future research could also explore the 
interplay between such regional tax organisations and a WTO as proposed by 
Sawyer.74  Ultimately, it is hoped that future research can refine such proposals to a 
point where they can be practically considered by policy makers and global leaders.
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8. APPENDIX
Interview Question Outline and Guide- (Semi-structured interviews)
Sections 1, 2 & 4 are intended for all interviewees.  Section 3 is directed towards the academic 
interviewees, although it may also be utilised with the other interviewees.
1 Current Vietnam tax administration issues faced by foreign investors
1.1 What is the extent of your current SE Asian investments (i.e. which nations, percentage of 
your business, history of operating in the area etc.)?
1.2 Do you view the SE Asia region as a growth area for your business warranting future 
expansion?
1.3 Is the recently signed Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with Vietnam likely to be a factor in any 
future investment decisions?
1.4 When/if making a decision whether or not to invest in a foreign country, what are the most 
important factors to consider?  The least important?
1.5 To what extent is a potential investment destinations tax administration an important 
consideration?
1.6 What issues with the Vietnamese tax administration or other SE Asian nation tax 
administrations are you aware of?
1.6.1 Do you find the regions tax laws clear/ easy to understand and interpret?  Why/why 
not?
1.6.2 Is language a complicating factor in understanding your tax obligations and paying
your taxes?  Why/why not?
1.6.3 Do you find it easy to challenge tax determinations that you may disagree with?
1.7 Do you consider any of these issues to impact upon foreign investment decisions, and if so, 
how?
1.8 Do you currently use a tax adviser to advise on your SE Asian tax obligations?
2. A Regional Tax Authority (RTA) as a potential reform avenue.
(The interviewer reiterates that an RTA would be an organisation established at the international 
level which may be used by foreign investors to pay national level taxes in addition to other 
functions such as possibly dispute settlement and the issuance of binding rulings.)
2.1 Do you consider the establishment of some form of RTA to be an attractive proposition for 
foreign investors?  Why/why not?
2.2 Do you consider it likely that such reform would be positive in encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)?  Why/Why not?
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2.3 Do you think that frequency of the tax administration issues discussed earlier in the interview 
would decrease with the establishment of such a body?  Why/why not?
2.4 What are the potential challenges of establishing such a RTA?
2.5 Do you currently use a tax adviser in SE Asia?  If so, would your use of such an adviser 
decrease or increase with the introduction of such an RTA?  Why?
2.6 What resistance do you think such a proposal is likely to encounter?  From whom?  Why?
2.7 What features do you think should be included in the formation of such a RTA at the time of 
formation?  Why?
2.8 What features do you consider to be the most important in order to maximise FDI?  Why?
2.9 What features do you consider to be the least important to attaining the goal of maximising 
FDI?  Why?
2.10 Do you consider it desirable for the jurisdiction of such an RTA to expand over time beyond 
the administration of taxes for foreign investors?
2.11 What features do you think should be added over time to expand the jurisdiction of the RTA?
2.12 (The interviewer reiterates Nolan Sharkeys recent proposal, as published in the British Tax 
Review in 2013, for a South East (SE) Asian Regional Tax Organisation (RTO) which 
includes such features as the setting of a common tax rate among SE Asian nations through 
the formation of a single SE Asian tax jurisdiction and the introduction of a SE Asian 
resident for tax purposes.)
2.12.1 What are your thoughts on this more radical approach compared to the less radical 
RTA proposal outlined above?
2.12.2 Would a single SE Asia tax rate administered by such an organisation be attractive to 
you when looking to increase its investment in the region?
3. Additional questions for the interview subjects who are academics:
3.1 Could such an RTA be effective in countering transfer pricing uncertainty?  If so, how?
3.2 How do you think such an organisation be structured/formed?  By treaty?  By any other 
method?
3.3 Who do you believe should be employed by the RTA to maximise effectiveness?  SE Asian 
nationals?  Expats?  Why/why not?
3.4 What accountability mechanisms do you consider it important to include in such a body?
3.5 What are the advantages/disadvantages of establishing such an organisation as an extension of 
ASEAN as opposed to under an independent treaty or any other method?
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3.6 Do you consider such an RTA to be a better solution than the OECD Semi-Autonomous 
Revenue Authority (SARA) model (interviewer explains if required) in countering the tax 
administration issues faced by foreign investors?  Why/why not?
4. For all interview subjects:
4.1 Are there any other comments that you wish to make?
